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a b s t r a c t
This paper introduces a game theoretic method, called forwarding dilemma game (FDG),
which controls routing overhead in dense multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks. The players
of the game are the wireless nodes with set of strategies {Forward, Not forward}. The game
is played whenever an arbitrary node in the network receives a ﬂooding packet. In FDG,
every player needs to know the number of players of the game. That is why a neighbor discovery protocol (NDP) is introduced. In order for NDP to function, a ﬁeld is attached to the
ﬂooding packets (routing overhead packets). The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is used
as a solution for the FDG. This provides the probability that the ﬂooding packet would be
forwarded by the receiver node. FDG with NDP is implemented in AODV protocol in Network Simulator NS-2 to verify its performance with simulations. FDG with NDP improves
performance of the AODV compared to the same network with only AODV protocol in moderate and high node densities. FDG can be applied to any routing protocol that uses ﬂooding in the route discovery phase.
Ó 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have received significant attention in recent years. Applications of this type of
network range from military and disaster response applications to connecting a group of computers in a classroom.
Numerous routing protocols have been introduced for ad
hoc networks. Broadly, these protocols can be classiﬁed
as 1. proactive routing protocols and 2. on-demand (reactive) routing protocols. In proactive routing, routing information is periodically exchanged between network nodes,
while in reactive protocols, the routing information is obtained only when it is needed. Flooding is used as the basic
mechanism to propagate control packets in reactive routing protocols such as AODV [1] and DSR [2] or for data forwarding in MANETs. Unfortunately, it has been shown that
ﬂooding is a problem even in networks with moderate
node densities [3]. Flooding generates a large number of
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redundant packets that consume network resources like
bandwidth and power, and causes contention, packet collision, packet loss, and delays. Since ﬂooding is a fundamental method in almost every routing protocol for wireless ad
hoc networks, a more efﬁcient ﬂooding algorithm could
signiﬁcantly improve the performance of the routing.
However, reducing the number of redundant ﬂooding messages may cause disconnectivity in the network. Therefore,
a delicate balance must be maintained between routing
overhead related to ﬂooding and connectivity. To reduce
the number of redundant messages, two mechanisms have
been proposed in the literature: (1) clustering and (2)
selective dropping of ﬂooding. Clustering or cluster-based
routing [4,5] can be described as grouping nodes into clusters. A representative of each group is called the cluster
head and other nodes are called cluster members. In order
to form and maintain clusters, network nodes need to
cooperate and exchange information with each other
which may increase the control overhead packets. Passive
clustering [5] has been proposed to exploit ongoing data
trafﬁc to propagate cluster related information. Although
passive clustering eliminates cluster related overhead
packets during the formation and maintenance of clusters,
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it still requires some partial information about the neighbors and ongoing data trafﬁc. Another mechanism to reduce ﬂooding is to selectively decrease the number of
messages. These mechanisms could be loosely classiﬁed
as probabilistic schemes [3,6–9] or location-based schemes
[10,11]. The simplest probabilistic approach is pure probabilistic ﬂooding [3] in which nodes that receive a broadcast
packet retransmit the packet with some probability p or
discard (drop) the packet with probability ð1  pÞ. There
is a critical value for p that depends on the number of
neighbors of a node [7]. As the number of neighbors of each
node increases, the critical value of p would decrease. The
major problem of probabilistic schemes is that the probability at which a node would rebroadcast is not universal,
but speciﬁc to each network topology and there is no analytical formula to obtain the probability p. Local topology
information is used to avoid unnecessary rebroadcasts in
location-based schemes. In [11,12], self-pruning and
neighbor-coverage schemes are proposed where a node
does not rebroadcast if the packet is delivered to all neighbors of this node by a prior broadcast.
Our approach in this paper falls into selectively reducing the number of ﬂooding messages by applying Game
Theory. Game Theory is not new to the area of telecommunications and wireless networks. It has been used to model
the interaction between users, to eliminate the selﬁsh
nodes and to coordinate nodes in ad hoc networks. The
topology control problems in ad hoc networks were studied and modeled as non-cooperative games in [13]. In that
model, network nodes can choose their power level to ensure desired connectivity. The model was divided into connectivity and reachability games. In the connectivity game,
a node chooses a power level that sustains connection to
other nodes while minimizing its cost. In the reachability
game, each node tries to reach as many other nodes as possible while minimizing its transmission range. A cooperation enforcement mechanism based on game theory has
been proposed in [14,15] that provides the study and analysis of strategies for cooperation and packet forwarding
enforcement among nodes. Basically, a node analyzes the
past behavior of its neighbors as well as the availability
of its resources prior to choosing its next action. Additionally, the cooperation game was described and investigated
in [14] as a repeated game for ad hoc networks with a titfor-tat (TFT) strategy, applying cooperation enforcement. It
was shown that by implementing such a strategy in the ad
hoc network, a node will not forward more packets than it
sends on average. In [15], nodes of the network were classiﬁed based on their energy level. Normalized acceptance
rate (NAR), the ratio of the number of forwarded packets
by the node to the number of forward requests, was considered as an evaluation metric for every node. Generous
tit-for-tat (GTFT) strategy was investigated in cooperating
repeated game in [15] as well. It was proved that GTFT is
a Nash equilibrium and converges to the rational and Pareto optimal NARs. In [16], a game theoretic framework
based on the Nash bargaining game was introduced that
solved the selﬁshness problem while reserving bandwidth
in the forwarding node’s neighborhood. The authors
showed that Nash equilibrium could be considered as a
pricing scheme that provides optimality in bandwidth res-

ervation and that applying the game theoretic model
efﬁciently eliminated selﬁsh nodes. A game theoretic
approach for the analysis of slotted Aloha with selﬁsh users
was proposed in [17]. It was shown that the performance
of the selﬁsh slotted Aloha system is near optimum, and
the system performance is close to the best non-game theoretic systems. In [18], slotted Aloha with multi-packet
reception was studied and it was proved that the stability
of a slotted Aloha system with multi-packet reception with
selﬁsh users is dependent on the transmission cost of a
packet. It was also shown that the throughput of a MAC
protocol with selﬁsh users could be lower than that of
other slotted Aloha implementations. One-shot random access game introduced in [19] analyzed the behavior of the
nodes using the tools of game theory. It was shown that
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium provided the focal
equilibrium among 2n  1 equilibrium points of the game,
and that it had fairness property as well.
In this paper, a game theoretic framework called forwarding dilemma game (FDG) will be introduced where
wireless nodes of the network are the players of the game.
The game is played when a node receives a ﬂooding packet
from other nodes in the network. The player has two strategies to play: 1. forward the packet or 2. drop (not forward)
the packet. The FDG has three components: 1. number of
players, N, the number of nodes that are receiving the
ﬂooding packet, 2. forwarding cost, and 3. network gain
factor, G. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will be employed to provide the probability of forwarding the ﬂooding messages. In order to enable nodes to discover the
number of the players of the FDG, a neighbor discovery
protocol (NDP) will also be introduced. In NDP, wireless
nodes use either medium access messages or HELLO messages that are inherent in some of the routing protocols
such as AODV and WRP [20]. In this paper, the FDG is
implemented in AODV with existing HELLO messages
where these messages are used for NDP with slight
modiﬁcation. The FDG limits the number of nodes that
participate in the route discovery of the protocol without
disturbing the connectivity. By conducting connectivity
tests, we veriﬁed that FDG not only improved connectivity
in dense networks, but also improved the network performance. This architectural change that reduces the routing
overhead signiﬁcantly helps nodes to ﬁnd routes faster
and reduces contention in the MAC layer. All of these
would reduce the average end-to-end delay.
The rest of the paper is organized into ﬁve sections. Section 2 discusses the proposed forwarding dilemma game.
Section 3 presents the implementation of the FDG in AODV
protocol. Section 4 investigates an optimum value for the
network gain factor, G, through analysis and simulations.
Section 5 presents NS-2 simulation results for the proposed
protocol and compares the results with those of AODV.
Section 6 provides the conclusions of this study.

2. Forwarding dilemma game
In MANETs, the connection between the nodes is established by the ﬂooding of data packets or control packets
(route discovery part of the reactive routing protocol). In
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either case, ﬂooding or rebroadcasting is the most reliable
technique to transfer data packets to a destination node or
to ﬁnd a route between source and destination. Fig. 1 depicts a portion of a wireless ad hoc network where a source
node, S, has a data packet to be sent to a destination node
that is located outside of its wireless transmission range.
Nodes that are located in the wireless transmission range
of source node S are neighbors of S. If the routing protocol
is simply ﬂooding, S will broadcast the data packets and
then these data packets are rebroadcasted by every neighbor of S, and every other node that receives them from the
neighbors of S, until they reach the destination. When reactive routing protocols such as DSR or AODV are utilized, instead of broadcasting data packets, S initiates a route
discovery protocol that involves broadcasting smaller
route request (RREQ) packets. The RREQ packets are
rebroadcasted (i.e. ﬂooded) by neighbors of S and any other
node that receives the RREQ from neighbors of S. When the
RREQ arrives at the destination node, the path is discovered from the route that the RREQ traveled through to
get to the destination. Then the destination node sends
the discovered route to the source node using the route reply packet (RREP). When the source node receives the
RREP, it starts sending data packets through the route that
was returned by RREQ. If the network is dense, there will
be a lot of redundant broadcasts of RREQ and RREP packets.
That redundancy not only makes the route selection complicated, but also degrades the overall performance of the
network because of the shared wireless channel. In a
shared medium, overhead packets increase delay per packet and the number of collisions, which in turn degrades the
packet delivery ratio and throughput. Here, we investigate
if a game theoretic packet forwarding model in a multi-hop
network can be used to minimize the degrading effect of
ﬂooding in dense MANETs. Game theory is a part of applied
mathematics that describes and studies interactive and
multi-player decision-making problems. Decision makers
(i.e. players) follow certain objectives while considering
knowledge or expectations of other decision makers. Game
theory has been widely applied in economics, social science, and biology [21–23].
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Here, a forwarding game is deﬁned as

G ¼ fN; ðSi Þi2N ; ðU i Þi2N g;

ð1Þ

where N is the number of participating wireless nodes
(players of the game), Si is the strategy set, and U i is the
utility function for the node (player) i. Strategy Si is the action set of the node i and Si ¼ f0; 1g, where Si ¼ 1 denotes
that node i is forwarding while Si ¼ 0 denotes that node i is
not forwarding the ﬂooding message. If the node chooses
to forward, it is called a Forwarding Node (FN) or a Mobile
Node (MN). Node i will receive utility U i upon choosing a
strategy. The game deﬁned in Eq. (1) is played whenever
arbitrary node i receives a packet pjk that is destined for
node k from node j. Here node i needs to make a decision
whether to forward pjk or not. The number of players of
the game is the number of nodes that receive pjk in the
same time slot as node i.
It is desirable that only a limited number of neighbors
of the source node participate in forwarding. This strategy
will improve resource utilization by reducing the number
of overhead packets, which in turn improves the performance of the network. The problem is the selection of
the necessary number of neighbors. This problem is similar to a situation in public economics where players would
like to save their resources. Only some contributors are
needed to bear the cost while the beneﬁt is enjoyed by
all players. In a voluntary contribution game, each person
in a group must decide whether to make a costly contribution or to rely on others’ contributions. Diekman
[24,25] introduced a game in which a collective good
can be provided by a volunteer from a group of players.
Here, Diekman’s game is adopted to the game of forwarding or not forwarding a ﬂooding packet and is called the
forwarding dilemma game (FDG). In this game, every node
in the network has a cost for rebroadcasting packets for
other nodes. Because of the forwarding cost in the model,
neighbors will not forward the ﬂooding packet right away,
but expects other neighboring nodes to forward. Let N > 1
be the number of players. Arbitrary player i chooses between forwarding ðSi ¼ 1Þ and not forwarding ðSi ¼ 0Þ. A
node that forwards bears a cost of f ðcÞ, where c is the forwarding cost and f ð:Þ is a decreasing function. Utility Gi
denotes the gain or beneﬁt that node i receives if at least
one of the players of the game spends the forwarding cost
and forwards the packet. Utility of node i in FDG is deﬁned
as

8
>
< Gi  f ðci Þ if Si ¼ 1
if Si ¼ 0; and 9 Sj ¼ 1 for some j–i ;
U i ðSÞ ¼ Gi
>
:
0
if Sj ¼ 0 for all j
ð2Þ

Fig. 1. Forwarding game played among neighboring nodes of the source
node S.

where N players are neighbors of the originator of the
ﬂooding packet and are receiving the ﬂooding packet in
the same time slot. Gi and f ðci Þ are the utility and cost function for arbitrary node i, related to the ﬂooding packet under process. The game has N equilibria with exactly one
forwarding node and N  1 mobile nodes. There exists also
a mixed strategy equilibrium. If arbitrary node i forwards
the ﬂooding packet with probability pi , the expected utility
of node i can be written as
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E½U i  ¼ pi ðGi  f ðci ÞÞ þ Gi ð1  pi Þð1 

!
Y
ð1  pj ÞÞ :
j–i

The best response function for the players can be written
as

Y
oE½U i 
¼ f ðci Þ þ Gi ð1  pj Þ:
opi
j–i

ð4Þ

Setting the derivative equal to zero, we get the following
system of equations

f ðci Þ ¼ Gi

Y

ð1  pj Þ:

1

ð3Þ

ð5Þ

Increasing G

Forwarding Probability
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0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

j–i

10

15

20

Number of neighbors

iÞ
If we denote ki ¼ f ðc
and qi ¼ ð1  pi Þ, the system of Eq. (5)
Gi
can be written as

8
q q . . . qN1 qN ¼ k1
>
>
> 2 3
>
>
q q . . . qN1 qN ¼ k2
>
>
< 1 3
..
:
.
>
>
>
>
>
> q1 q2 . . . qN2 qN ¼ kN1
>
:
q1 q2 . . . qN2 qN1 ¼ kN

ð6Þ

If we multiply the above N equations, we can write:

ðq1 q2 q3 . . . qN1 qN ÞN1 ¼ k1 k2 . . . kN1 kN :

ð7Þ

The forwarding probability of arbitrary node i, pi , can be
written by substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (7):

sﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
Q
kj

N1

pi ¼ 1 

5

j¼1

ki

:

ð8Þ

The cost function f ðcÞ is considered a decreasing function
to encourage nodes with lower cost to increase their forwarding probability.
In the case where the gain and forwarding cost of the
nodes are equal ðk1 ¼ k2 ¼    ¼ kN Þ, the forwarding dilemma game (FDG) will be symmetric and can be depicted in
the matrix form shown in Fig. 2. Please note that the source
node S is not necessarily the originator of the packet and it
could be any intermediate node that is forwarding a ﬂooding packet, such as RREQ packets. Player one (row player)
in the FDG of Fig. 2 is any node that has received a ﬂooding
packet and needs to make a decision to forward or not forward that packet based on the forwarding game. The column player of the forwarding game of Fig. 2 are other
ðN  1Þ neighbors of S. If player 1 forwards, its utility will
be G  C regardless of the action of other neighbors. If none
of the neighbors forward, then all of them lose and receive
a payoff of 0. It is assumed that C < G, so each node would

Fig. 2. Symetric forwarding dilemma game (FDG) matrix.

Fig. 3. Forwarding probability changes with node density of the network
and the deﬁned gain G for the nodes, C = 1.

prefer to forward if no other node does. But if one node is
expected to forward, then each of the others would prefer
to ‘‘free ride” and would not spend their energy and occupy
unnecessary bandwidth.
The forwarding game depicted in Fig. 2 has N equilibria,
where only one node forwards and the other nodes do not
forward. Since the players (nodes) make independent decisions, the strategy chosen by the players is unknown by
others. On the other hand, since G  C > 0, there exists
no dominant strategy.1 In a symmetric mixed strategy2
Nash equilibrium for the forwarding game of Fig. 2, let us
denote the forwarding probability (probability that a player
chooses the ‘‘Forward” strategy) as p, consequently probability that a player plays the ‘‘Not Forward” strategy is ð1  pÞ.
All ðN  1Þ other players will not forward with a probability
of ð1  pÞN1 . Therefore, we can write the probability of having at least one forwarding node out of the ðN  1Þ neighbors
as 1  ð1  pÞN1 . With that, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be constructed as follows:

G  C ¼ Gð1  ð1  pÞN1 Þ:

ð9Þ

From the above equation, the probability of forwarding can
be calculated as

p¼1

1
 N1
C
:
G

ð10Þ

In Eq. (10), if C < G, then GC < 1. Therefore, the probability of
forwarding for an arbitrary node decreases when the number of neighbors, N, increases. For example, in the limiting
cases, while N is changing from 1 to inﬁnity, the probability
of forwarding will be changing from 1 to 0. Fig. 3 depicts
the forwarding probability that is given in Eq. (10) with
increasing number of neighbors of the source, from 1 to
20, for different values of network gain, G. When the number of neighbors of the source is lower, the forwarding
probability is higher. For example, for N ¼ 1, regardless of
the value of G and forwarding cost C, the forwarding probability will be 1. In a denser network, the number of neighbors of the source will be higher than 1, and every node

1
Dominant strategy for a player is the one that yields the best utility
regardless of the strategies that other players choose.
2
Mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of
pure strategies of that player.
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will reduce its forwarding probability. For example, for
N ¼ 20, the forwarding probability can be between 0.3
and 0.8, as shown Fig. 3, based on the parameter G that
was deﬁned for the network. This deﬁnes G as an important parameter that controls the decision process in the
node, consequently routing overhead in the network. The
selection of the value for G and its effect on network performance will be investigated in the following sections.
3. Implementation of forwarding dilemmas game in
AODV
In this section, the implementation of the forwarding dilemma game (FDG) into AODV routing protocol is explained.
In the AODV protocol, HELLO messages are periodically
broadcasted by nodes and are used for link monitoring.
When node A receives a HELLO message from node B, it discovers that node B is in its wireless transmission range and
therefore its neighbor. On the other hand, not receiving a
HELLO message from a node is interpreted as a broken link.
In order to utilize AODV HELLO messages to obtain neighbor
information for FDG, a neighbor discovery protocol (NDP) is
introduced in Fig. 4. In NDP, it is assumed that the links are
symmetric. The source ID of the sender is deciphered from
the header of the HELLO messages. Every node generates a
time-stamped list of its neighbors (i.e. the source ID of the
HELLO message that it has received). The neighbor list is updated periodically and outdated entries are removed. The
number of neighbors of a node is the number of entries in
the updated neighbor list.
In order to implement the FDG protocol, the route discovery process and the structure of RREQ packets in AODV
protocol is modiﬁed. An extra ﬁeld is added to the RREQ to
carry the number of neighbors of the source node. Fig. 5
shows the modiﬁcation in the route discovery process of
AODV. When a source node generates a RREQ packet, in
addition to its ID, it also inserts the number of its neighbors
N, into the RREQ packet. This is also done at the intermediate nodes. When the RREQ packet is forwarded by an intermediate node, the number of neighbors of the intermediate
node as well as its ID is inserted into the related ﬁelds of
the RREQ packet. When the RREQ is received by other
nodes, the number of neighbors, N, of the originator (forwarder) of the RREQ can be discovered. Using N in Eq.
(10), the receiver of the RREQ can calculate the probability
of forwarding for that RREQ. Then, the forwarding probability is compared to a generated uniform random number
to make the forwarding decision. In the FDG protocol, if the
source node does not receive a RREP from the destination
for any reason (e.g. link quality), it initiates another RREQ.
Nodes that did not forward the RREQ in the previous round
increase their forwarding probability by 20% each time.
This is similar to the ring search technique in AODV and
guarantees arrival of the RREQ at the destination.
4. Disconnectivity vs. greedy ﬂooding: optimum value
for G
In the previous section, the forwarding dilemma game
(FDG) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as the solu-
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tion of this game were explained. The probability of forwarding for every node, derived in Eq. (10), depends
strictly on the network gain parameter G. Without the loss
of generality in this investigation, a forwarding cost of
C ¼ 1 is assumed. The investigation shifts to determining
the range of values for parameter G, such that network
connectivity is established with minimum routing overhead. When G is low, the forwarding probability is low,
which might cause isolated nodes and disconnectivity in
the network. In this case, the cost–gain ratio GC is not large
enough to encourage selﬁsh nodes to forward a packet for
others. On the other hand, for high values of G, nodes increase their forwarding probability to obtain high utility
value. When G ! 1, the performance of the protocol
would not improve by FDG. This case is called greedy
ﬂooding. There has been extensive research conducted on
the connectivity conditions of ad hoc networks. The critical
power and the number of neighbors needed to obtain overall network connectivity by using stochastic modeling is
analyzed in [26]. Authors showed that the critical neighbor
number (CNN) for connectivity is k log N, with
0:074 < k < 5:1774. Determining the minimum number
of nodes that is required for full connectivity in a stationary network with uniform node spatial distribution is formulated in [27]. That formulation showed that in an ideal
case, without inter-node interference, the minimum number of neighbors required for full connectivity is p. Under
the guidance of the results presented in [26,27], it is considered that, on average, 4 neighbors for each node would
sufﬁce to establish connectivity among the nodes with
high probability. If a node is processing a packet whose
source has fewer than 4 neighbors, it should have a probability of forwarding, p, in the range of 0:9 6 p 6 0:99. In
other words, if q is the probability of not forwarding, then
q is required to be in the range 0:01 6 q 6 0:1. Hence, Eq.
(10) can be rewritten for q as

q¼

1
 N1
C
:
G

ð11Þ

By taking the logarithm of both sides of Eq. (11), the following can be obtained

ð1  NÞ log q ¼ logðGÞ:

ð12Þ

Since it is required to have 0:01 6 q 6 0:1 for N 6 4, the
network gain G should be in the range of 3 6 logðGÞ 6 6
to provide optimum operation. This range provides equitable trade offs between connectivity and network
performance.
In order to verify the feasible values of G and to test the
effect of G on network performance, we performed a series
of experiments utilizing network simulator (NS-2) [28]. In
the simulations, nodes were uniformly distributed in an
area of 1000 by 1000 m. The network gain factor G was
varied in the simulations, and forwarding cost C was set
to 1 for all nodes. There were 60 sources with CBR (constant bit rate), where each were sending one 512 byte
packet per second. The source nodes and their start time
were randomly chosen. Simulations ran for 200 s with
modiﬁed AODV routing protocol with the FDG. In order
to explore the effect of different node densities on the
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Fig. 4. Integrating NDP with AODV.

results, experiments with 100 and 160 nodes were performed as well. Figs. 6 and 7 depict average end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio of the network, respectively,
for different values of network gain factor, G. For smaller
values of G, the incentive to forward packets is minimal

compared to the cost (e.g. logðGÞ < 3). Since the forwarding
probability calculated by the nodes is small, the chance
that RREQ packets do not reach the destination in the ﬁrst
round is high. In that case, the RREQ packet is re-sent by
the source, and the receiving nodes increase their forward-
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Fig. 5. Flowchart: implementing the forwarding game protocol.
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Fig. 6. Average end-to-end delay vs. network gain factor G.

ing probability by 10%. This explains higher than average
end-to-end delay for smaller values of G (Fig. 6). For
logðGÞ P 6, the average end-to-end delay starts to in-

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Log(G), Network Gain Factor
Fig. 7. Packet delivery ratio vs. network gain factor G.

crease. This shows that due to high utility, nodes increase
their forwarding probability up to a point where every
node decides to forward RREQs. The simulation results
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conﬁrm that the near optimum value for logðGÞ is between
4 and 6.

In order to evaluate performance and verify connectivity of the FDG with AODV protocol, NS-2 simulations were
performed. In the simulations, the effective transmission
range of the wireless radio was 250 m and the medium access control (MAC) protocol was IEEE 802.11 with 2 megabits per second channel capacity. IEEE 802.11 MAC was in
distributed coordination function mode and used requestto-send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) control packets [29]
for unicast data transmission to a neighboring node. The
RTS/CTS exchanges precede the data packet transmission
and implement a form of virtual carrier sensing and channel reservation to reduce the impact of the hidden terminal
problem. Data packet transmission is followed by an ACK.
To compare the performance of the proposed protocol,
the FDG with AODV, and only AODV, the following metrics
were considered:
 Average end-to-end delay per packet is the end-to-end
delay (in seconds) for successfully received packets.
 Packet delivery ratio is the ratio between the number of
successfully received packets and the number of generated packets by the CBR sources.
 Normalized routing overhead is the number of routing
packets per one data packet that is successfully received
at the destination.

Connectivity (percent)

5. Simulation model and results

0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
40

AODV+FDG
AODV

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Number of nodes (node density)
Fig. 8. Connectivity vs. number of nodes.

dom seeds. The average of those simulations is shown in
Fig. 8. Disconnectivity is expected in low node density
regardless of the routing protocol (e.g. 40 nodes). Connectivity in network with FDG was close to the one with AODV
in moderate node densities (60–100 nodes). Surprisingly,
connectivity in the network with AODV dropped when
the number of nodes in the network increased more than
80 nodes. This is related to the broadcast storm problem
discussed previously. Our investigation showed that AODV
with FDG not only matches the connectivity achieved by
AODV alone, but also improves connectivity in moderate
to high node densities.
5.2. Performance evaluation

5.1. Connectivity
Connectivity is a major concern in any routing protocol
for ad hoc networks. Because the FDG functionality is
based on probability, one concern is that ﬂooding messages may not be forwarded by some of the nodes. In
FDG, if the source node does not receive a reply from the
destination, the ﬂooding packet will be rebroadcasted by
the source. Neighbors that have not forwarded the ﬂooding
packet in the previous rounds, increase their forwarding
probability by 20% in each round. A test was conducted
to verify connectivity in FDG and compare it with AODV results. In this test, source and destination nodes are positioned at two diagonal corners in a 1000 by 1000 m ﬁeld,
while other nodes are uniformly distributed in the area
and do not generate data packets. All of the nodes are static
and there is no mobility. At the beginning of the simulation
the source node generates only one data packet for the destination node. To discover the route, a RREQ packet is
broadcasted by the source. If source does not receive a
RREP from the destination within a certain time (30 ms
in this setup), it broadcasts another RREQ up to a predeﬁned number of times (4 times in our setup) [1]. If the data
packet is not received by the destination within 4 s, this
event is declared as disconnectivity, otherwise it is counted
as connectivity. The number of nodes in the network were
varied from 40 to 180 nodes, and simulations were repeated 1000 times for every scenario with different ran-

Previously, we claimed that implementing FDG in AODV
improves the performance of the routing protocol. We conducted NS-2 simulations to verify our claim. In the simulations, the trafﬁc sources were generated by constant bit
rate (CBR) sources with 512 bytes per packet, which were
started randomly during the simulations and continued
until the data packets were transferred. Source and sink
nodes were chosen based on a uniform distribution at
the beginning of each simulation. All the sources had a certain amount of data that needed to be transferred to the
sinks. Nodes were randomly distributed in the area in each
simulation, therefore their locations were different in
every simulation. Five NS-2 simulations were run for every
scenario, and the reported results are the average of these
simulation runs.
In order to show if FDG enhances the performance of
the network at different node densities compared to AODV
alone, the number of nodes in a 1000 by 1000 m area were
varied. The nodes were uniformly distributed to that area
randomly. The 60 communication pairs remained the same
for all scenarios. Therefore the results only reﬂected the
change due to the increasing number of nodes or node densities. The simulation time was 200 s, and the data packet
rate of the CBR was 1 packet per second for all scenarios.
The number of wireless nodes varied between 130 and
250. Figs. 9–11 show normalized overhead, packet delivery
ratio, and average end-to-end delay per packet versus the
number of nodes in the network, respectively. The routing
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ratio of the modiﬁed routing protocol outperforms the
AODV protocol alone. The difference was signiﬁcant (3–5
times higher) especially at higher node densities. The modiﬁed protocol performed and delivered close to 95% of the
data packets; whereas the non-modiﬁed protocol did not
work at all. Reduction in routing overhead also helped reduce the average delay. Fig. 11 compares the average endto-end delay in using AODV with FDG, versus using AODV
alone with all other network parameters held the same.
The network with the FDG was not sensitive to the increasing node densities, whereas the network with AODV
showed a sharp increase in packet delay with increasing
node densities.

Number of nodes (node density)

6. Conclusions

Fig. 9. Normalized overhead vs. number of nodes.
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Fig. 10. Packet delivery ratio vs. number of nodes.
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This paper introduced a game theoretic approach, called
forwarding dilemma game (FDG), for forwarding the ﬂooding packets in wireless ad hoc networks. The FDG provides
nodes the use of a strategy set S ¼ fForward; NotForwardg.
The probability of the selected strategy is then calculated
based on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
This limits the number of redundant broadcasts in dense
networks while still allowing connectivity. This approach
has two advantages over previously proposed methods
used to control ﬂooding. Firstly, nodes employ FDG to calculate the probability of forwarding adaptively. Secondly,
unlike hierarchical or clustering methods, the proposed
modiﬁcation does not cause extra routing overhead. Simulation results show that AODV with FDG outperforms the
AODV routing protocol, especially in dense network
scenarios where routing overhead is a dominant factor
degrading the network performance. This game can be applied to a large class of routing protocols that have ﬂooding
as a preliminary method of route discovery. In addition to
the FDG, a neighbor discovery algorithm that enables
nodes to discover the number of their neighbors was integrated in AODV to allow FDG to work properly.
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Fig. 11. Average end-to-end delay vs. number of nodes.

overhead was lower in networks that employed AODV
with FDG than AODV alone, because AODV with FDG selectively eliminated RREQ packets. The result reported in
Fig. 9 conﬁrms the fact that the normalized routing overhead was 2–3 times lower in AODV with FDG. Fig. 10
shows the packet delivery ratios of the network with two
competing protocols. As shown in the ﬁgure, the delivery
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